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THE SUPREME DIGITAL DIVIDE
Mary Graw Leary *
“[B]ecause of the role that these devices have come to play in contemporary
life, searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that
this Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.” 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

Society has long struggled with the meaning of privacy in a modern
world. 2 This struggle is not new. With the advent of modern technology
and information sharing, however, the challenges have become more
complex. 3 Socially, Americans seek to both protect their private lives, and
* Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. Many thanks to
Steve Young for his outstanding assistance; Katherine Olson and Tina Lee for their research; Arnold
Loewy for his commitment to exploring critical Fourth Amendment issues; and the Texas Tech Law
Review staff for their dedication and patience.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.B.
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also to utilize technology to connect with the world. Commercially,
industries seek to obtain information from individuals, often without their
consent, and sell it to the highest bidder. 4 As technology has advanced, the
ability of other individuals, institutions, and governments to encroach upon
this privacy has strengthened. 5 Nowhere is this tension between individual
privacy rights and government security interests felt more acutely than
within the context of the Fourth Amendment. 6
Notwithstanding the long duration of this struggle, jurisprudentially,
the nation is at a critical point. Traditionally, the touchstone for analyzing
the boundaries of Fourth Amendment searches is reasonableness. 7 Quite
literally, therefore, the Supreme Court has the task of determining the
unanswerable: What is reasonable? 8 This task, combined with the modern
realities of rapidly changing technology, increased use of government
surveillance, and changing expectations and conceptions of privacy, as well
as differing perspectives of privacy in a heterogeneous society, becomes an
even further complicated endeavor. 9
One of the significant realities in play at this critical juncture lies
within the Court itself. This Article asserts that there is a new, different
form of the digital divide—the divide between the perspective of the Court
and twenty-first century realities—which has the potential to negatively
impact Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 10 This Article focuses on two
specific aspects of that gap, arguing that this gap in experience and
perspective contributes to false presumptions by the Court, which then leads
to less than optimal opinions. 11 Such an approach creates a veritable house
of cards in which the opinions themselves are weakened and erode over
time. 12 The potential of the Court to add crucial guidance in the area of
privacy law in contemporary society is immense. 13 That being said, any

4. See generally Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof – Saving the Fourth Amendment from
Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 341, 343–44 (2013) [hereinafter Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof] (discussing entities that collect
data online about individuals); Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones:
Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 331, 333 (2012) [hereinafter Leary, Missed Opportunity] (discussing commercial
technologies that eliminate expectations of privacy).
5. See infra Parts II–III.
6. See infra Part II.
7. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1048 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part VI.
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constructive impact is compromised when the validity of the opinions
precludes their ability to withstand the test of time. 14
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the gap generally, with specific
attention paid to the divide between the Court and technological realities,
and the gap between the Court and the realities of modern policing and
pressures on law enforcement. 15 These sections specifically argue that
these divides result in opinions purporting to determine what is reasonable
in modern life, but which rest upon a set of inaccurate presumptions.16 Part
IVwill illustrate this phenomenon by analyzing Riley v. California, in which
the Court held that the police may not dispense with the warrant
requirement to search arrestees’ cell phones incident to arrest.17 This
section will examine three inaccurate presumptions made in Riley, arguing
that they contribute to a failed jurisprudence in this critical area. 18 Part
Vwill discuss the significance of this approach by the Court.19 Finally, Part
VI will explore ways to reform this approach in the future. 20
II. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN DEVELOPING FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” 21 This clause, referred to as the “Reasonableness Clause” of
the Fourth Amendment, requires the Court to determine which government
searches are reasonable and which are not, thereby violating the Fourth
Amendment. 22 The Court’s history of developing a workable framework
for this analysis is somewhat inconsistent. While originally utilizing a
trespass–property law framework, the Court moved from that approach in
1965 in Katz v. United States, adopting a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” analysis. 23 In so doing, the Court explicitly stated that property
law was no longer the Court’s approach. 24 More recently, however, the

14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Parts I–II.
16. See infra Parts I–II.
17. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2442, 2451–53 (2015) (discussing the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53, 361 (1967).
24. Id. As the Court noted in Katz, “The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited.” Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Peni. v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 183–84
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Supreme Court reverted back to a property analysis in United States v.
Jones, when it concluded that the Katz approach supplemented the trespass–
property framework, but did not replace it. 25
Notwithstanding this somewhat inconsistent and convoluted history, 26
the Court has not retreated from its repeated assertion that “the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” 27 This inquiry
does not require a determination of what is reasonable to the Court; 28 rather,
the Katz inquiry defines the reasonable expectation of privacy test as a twoThe test (originally from Justice Harlan’s
pronged approach. 29
concurrence) demands, absent an exception to the warrant requirement, a
search warrant if the government examines an area in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 30 The reasonableness of this
expectation is determined by establishing the following: (1) the individual
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in the location searched (the
subjective prong); and (2) that expectation is one that society is prepared to
accept as reasonable (the objective prong). 31 As such, a fundamental role of
the Court in determining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is
determining reasonableness.
III. THE JUDICIAL DIGITAL DIVIDE
The term digital divide is one that traditionally refers to the divide
between different segments of the population regarding access to
technology and the Internet. It references the divide between “information
rich” and “information poor.” 32 It has also been used to refer to the
technological divide between affluent and more impoverished communities

(1984).(applying the Katz test and the open fields doctrine to conclude that, although there was a
trespass, there was no Fourth Amendment violation).
25. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
964 (Alito, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 959–60 (Alito, J., concurring) (disputing this revisionist history regarding Katz). For a
full discussion of the dubious mischaracterization of Katz by the Jones majority, see Leary, Missed
Opportunity, supra note 4, at 342.
27. E.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S.
Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
28. E.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing, as a
longtime critic of the Katz test, that one of the problems with the reasonable expectation of privacy test
is that judges tend to only assess what is reasonable to them).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 360.
32. E.g., Gerald Doppelt, Equality and the Digital Divide, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601,
601 (2002).
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“based on race, income, ethnicity, education, profession, and gender,” 33 as
well as the different uses and approaches to technology between digital
natives and digital immigrants.34
Another divide exists, however. This divide, labeled here the “judicial
digital divide,” is between the Court and the reality of modern life for both
the public as well as for law enforcement. 35 Such a divide is one with far
reaching consequences, given the role of the Supreme Court in determining
what is reasonable. 36 This is particularly true within the context of
technology because three phenomena occur simultaneously.
Technology is playing an increasing role in the public’s life.
Individuals are using technology in their vehicles, with their cell phones,
through the Internet, even in their eyewear and watches.37 They do so to
bank, date, and engage in other activities traditionally thought to be
personal. 38 In so doing, individuals, often unknowingly, create numerous
pieces of information, thereby exposing themselves to infinite opportunities
to be monitored and have information collected about them. 39 An entire
industry has developed around the collection of this data and its
unauthorized use by third parties. 40 The government is no different, and in
certain situations, seeks to obtain this information in its law enforcement
and anti-terrorism efforts. 41 The use of technology is also manifested in law
enforcement advancements themselves. 42 Law enforcement increasingly
uses technology to become more efficient, accurate, and effective. 43
Whether it is DNA collection, license plate readers, or video monitoring,

33. Id.; see also Amir Hatem Ali, Note, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New
Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 188 (2011)
(defining “digital divide” as describing unequal distribution of communication technology).
34. E.g., Kari Mercer Dalton, Bridging the Digital Divide and Guiding the Millennial Generation’s
Research and Analysis, 18 BARRY L. REV. 167, 167 (2012); Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1039 (2011).
35. See infra Part III.A–B.
36. See cases cited supra note 27.
37. See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy
and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. no 2., 2015, at 1, 6,
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i2/article6.pdf; Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use 2015, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smarthphone-use-in-2015/ (documenting the
effect smartphones have on all aspects of modern life).
38. See Susannah Fox, 51% of U.S. Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/; Amanda Lenhart, Dating &
Mating in the Digital Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 26, 2014), www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/26/datingmating-in-the-digital-age.
39. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1092–95 (2002).
40. Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof, supra note 4.
41. See Solove, supra note 39, at 1106.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
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the government seeks to advance its mission through use of technology. 44
Finally, technology affords criminals new avenues to victimize people.45
Whether it be through exploitation, identity theft, financial crimes, or
otherwise, criminals use technological tools to victimize others. 46 As such,
law enforcement is expected to engage on this additional battlefield in its
efforts to prevent and respond to crime. 47
Thus, the opportunity for government evidence collection through
technology is growing exponentially, and any divide between the Court and
reality regarding technology potentially has significant implications.48 This
divide manifests itself most clearly in two aspects: (1) in the chasm
between the Court’s understanding of technology and how it is used by
people in everyday life; and (2) the chasm also exists between the Court and
the realities of modern policing. 49
A. The Ivory Tower Concept Is Not Novel
The Court has long suffered the critique that it functions in an “ivory
tower” far separated from the experience of everyday Americans. 50 This
reality has been observed in many different contexts. 51
Significant scholarship has addressed these criticisms in the arena of
race and police interaction with minority communities. 52 Professor Donna
Coker insightfully commented that “[i]n the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, ‘there is a tendency . . . to pretend that the world we all know
is not the world in which law enforcement operates.’” 53 Others have
commented upon the individual Justices’ lack of experiences common to
most people. 54 For example, much was made about the implication by
Justice Roberts that he has never been subjected to a police traffic stop. 55
Similarly, the Court has been criticized for its statement that donating large
sums of money to candidates is unrelated to corruption and for failing to
44. See, e.g., infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., infra notes 79–114 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
48. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
49. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
50. See infra note 56.
51. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
53. Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice
System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 827 (2003) (quoting Stephen A Saltzburg, The Supreme
Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 133 (2003)).
54. See, e.g., infra note 55 and accompanying text.
55. Cristian Farias, The Chief Justice Has Never Been Pulled Over in His Life, SLATE (Feb.
11, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/02/chief
_justice_john_ roberts_has_never_been_pulled_over_rodriguez_v_united.html.
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understand that it is impossible for a victim of sexual discrimination to file
a complaint of discrimination until she is actually made aware of a salary
disparity between herself and her male co-workers. 56 These critiques share
a common theme: a gap between the experiences of the members of the
Court and the experiences of the public. 57 This gap seems to affect the
decisions of the Court, which has the potential to cause harm when the
Court is trying to determine what is reasonable to the common person.
B. The Divide Is Magnified When It Relates to Technology
When it comes to technology, the gap is even more significant. 58
Some better known examples of the disconnect between the Court and the
everyday use of technology in America illustrate this point.59 For example,
Justice Kagan’s remarks have been interpreted as stating that the Court is
“basically clueless when it comes to technology,” conceding the Justices
were not well versed in email—in 2013. 60 Chief Justice Roberts rather
famously asked during oral argument what the difference was between a
pager and email. 61 In Riley, Justice Roberts illustrated the disconnect
between his experience and that of many Americans by aggressively
challenging an advocate’s representation that many people not engaged in
criminal activity have more than one cell phone on their person. 62 The
Court further displayed an equal ignorance in Quon when it asked about
what would happen when two texts were sent at the same time. 63
Unfortunately, the media has covered these events with an almost
quaint tone. They are humorously presented as though they were vignettes
from one’s cousin in a foreign country unfamiliar with local customs. 64
However, there is little humorous about a lack of understanding of everyday
life in America by the body charged with determining what a reasonable
American expects or a reasonable officer does.
56. Mougambi Jouet, Is the Supreme Court Disconnected from the Real World?, THE HILL (Apr.
22, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/203982-is-the-supreme-courtdisconnected-from-the-real-world (discussing critiques of the Supreme Court for its reasoning in both
Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
57. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
60. E.g., Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits Supreme Court Justices Haven’t Quite Figured Out
Email Yet, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/08/20/elena_kagan_
supreme_court_justices_haven_t_gotten_to_email_use_paper_memos.html.
61. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 081332).
62. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (2014) (No. 13-212).
63. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 44.
64. See, e.g., Oremus, supra note 60.
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This judicial digital divide, raises some serious questions regarding an
institution whose average age of retirement is 78.7 years and whose average
age of membership is nearly 70 years old, and the Court’s ability to
measure the reasonableness expected in modern, everyday life. 65 This is
not to say that people over any certain age are unable to understand
technological changes. 66 That is certainly not the case or the basis for this
Article’s argument. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion and
Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in judgment in Jones both reflect insight
into the changing technological landscape.67 Justice Alito calls for a
legislative response to questions regarding digital surveillance, arguing that
the legislature is indeed better equipped to measure societal expectations. 68
For her part, Justice Sotomayor has expressed a willingness to revisit basic
Fourth Amendment doctrines, such as the third-party doctrine, in light of
their unworkability in a modern technological age. 69
Notwithstanding these periodic insights, there is a tension between a
Court that experiences a different reality than most of society, combined
with its intentional, slow movement deciding issues regarding a rapidly
changing aspect of life. 70 In addition to technology-induced changes, there
can be no doubt that society’s expectations of privacy are changing rapidly
and becoming more complex. The Pew Research Center reports that “the
majority of adults . . . feel that their privacy is being challenged along such
core dimensions as the security of their personal information and their
ability to retain confidentiality.” 71 The fluidity of these perceptions is
problematic as the Court attempts to discern the public’s privacy

65. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Justice for Life? The Case for Supreme Court Term
Limits, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20050414061240/http://www.
opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006539; Lawrence Hurley, In U.S., When High Tech
Meets High Court, High Jinks Ensue, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/rin-us-when-high-tech-meets-high-court-high-jinks-ensue-2014-09 (calculating the average age of
Supreme Court Justices at just over 68).
66. See supra Part III.
67. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957
(Alito, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
70. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“The Court must proceed with care
when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic
equipment . . . . The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications
of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”).
71. MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE POST
SNOWDEN
ERA
2
(2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf.
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expectations. 72 As the public’s expectation shifts, so too must the Court’s
reflection of it. 73
The issue of privacy is critical to contemporary life. 74 It is also an
evolving and complex issue due to the role technology plays in daily life,
perpetrating crime, and government surveillance. 75 Within this complicated
landscape, the Court is charged with determining what is reasonable.
However, the judicial digital divide is problematic in this regard.76 It
results in the Court making inaccurate presumptions and resting opinions on
them. 77 This is detrimental not only because the opinions are not strong,
but also because it creates an untenable legal situation. 78 This is an area in
the law in need of solid jurisprudence. 79 When the Court’s opinions are
flawed due to false presumptions, the entire system suffers. 80 Thus, the
judicial digital divide undermines the value of the Court’s opinions, as well
as its ability to offer clarity to individuals and law enforcement. 81 An
example of this phenomenon is the Court’s analysis in Riley v. California. 82
IV. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
A. The Opinion
The judicial digital divide is very clearly demonstrated in Riley v.
California, which held that the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, and police must generally
obtain a warrant before conducting a search.83 The opinion itself involved
two cases in which the police performed some form of a search on an
arrestee’s cell phone. 84 In Riley, the police searched the arrestee’s
smartphone incident to his arrest and later at the police station, observing
information related to gang activity. 85 The government used that
information against Riley for charges related to a gang shooting. 86 In the
72. See supra Part II.
73. See supra Part II.
74. See supra note 71.
75. See infra Part IV.B.1.
76. See supra Part III.
77. See supra Part II.
78. See supra Part I.
79. See supra Part I.
80. See supra Part I.
81. See supra Part I.
82. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (discussing the reasonableness of a
warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone during a search incident to arrest).
83. See id. at 2485. While the majority opinion discussed several aspects of Riley, this Article will
briefly summarize its framework.
84. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–82.
85. Id. at 2480.
86. Id. at 2481.
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companion case, United States v. Wurie, police examined incoming calls
and the phone log of a “flip” cell phone which helped them determine the
arrestee’s address and locate narcotics stored there. 87
The Court acknowledged some of the basic characteristics of the
modern cell phone, noting that modern-day cell phones are different than
other types of items that may be seized from an arrestee. 88 The Court paid
specific attention to the ability of a cell phone to store vast quantities of
information. 89 But it further recognized it is not just the amount of
information that can be accessed, but the type of information, which
includes financial records, records of purchases, internet searches, and GPS
information, that makes cell phones unique. 90
The Court began its analysis by noting that the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement rests on two justifications: officer
safety and concerns about the destruction of evidence. 91 The Court found
that the data on the phone was not a danger to police and, therefore, did not
justify a search of the phone without a warrant. 92 The Riley Court further
held that concerns regarding evidence destruction raised by the prosecution,
namely encryption and data wiping, were not persuasive because such
action would be effectuated by third parties or the ordinary functioning of
the phone. 93 Therefore, the Court reasoned that such occurrences were not
implicated by Chimel’s concern that an arrestee himself will destroy
evidence due to arrest. 94 A main concern was that the data, either alone or
in combination with other pieces of information, has the potential to reveal
highly personal information. 95 Furthermore, the data is not analogous to the
type of information an individual would traditionally have on his person
when arrested or even in his home. 96 Thus, the Court concluded that both
the quantity and quality of data on a cell phone distinguished the cell phone
from other items found on an arrested person. 97 The Court recognized the
growing reality that viewing cell phones as containers similar to other
containers on an arrestee is problematic due to society’s evolving uses of
cell phones. 98

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2488–90.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2485 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)).
Id.
Id. at 2486–87.
Id. at 2486–88.
Id. at 2490.
Id.
Id. at 2490–91.
Id.
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Moreover, cell phone technology continues to evolve. Increasingly,
cell phones are not saving data on the devices themselves, but instead act
as portals to information stored remotely. 99 Although the Government
conceded that searches incident to arrest could not access information on
the cloud, the Court rejected the Government-suggested solution of
implementing protocols for such searches. 100 As the Court put it rather
bluntly, “[t]he Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to
government agency protocols.” 101
B. Presumptions
The purpose of this Article is not necessarily to critique Riley’s
ultimate holding that the police must obtain a warrant prior to examining a
cell phone found on an arrestee. Given the distinction between cell phones
and other devices often possessed by individuals at the time of arrest, this
holding is with merit. It is a legitimate conclusion that the privacy interests
of an individual in his cell phone outweigh the government’s interest in
searching the phone. The focus of this Article is to analyze the framework
and approach of the Court in Riley.
The specific concerns examined here are the presumptions the Riley
Court made in its discussion, which formed the basis for its decision. The
Court’s presumptions focused upon in this Article all have to do with
technology or law enforcement, and are arguably flawed. When the Court’s
jurisprudence in such an important area is flawed, it undermines the law.
As the Court mentioned in Riley, it has a “general preference to provide
clear guidance.” 102 Guidance cannot be clear if the basis for that guidance
is compromised due to a lack of an appreciation of certain realities.
The following is a discussion of three presumptions in the Riley
opinion that are arguably flawed. This Article submits that this pattern of
presumptions can compromise the positive impact the Court can have on
the difficult questions presented by modern-day privacy expectations. 103
1. Presumption 1: The Threat of Remote Wiping Is Invalid
Remote wiping, also known as a mobile kill switch, is the ability of a
person to remotely remove data, apps, or even the operating system from a

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 2491.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part V.
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cell phone. 104 Riley discussed the Government’s main argument that the
possibility of a seized cell phone being remotely wiped created a true threat
of evidence destruction. 105 The Court rejected this argument, stating that
“once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no
longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating
data from the phone.” 106 Embedded within this presumption are two faulty
grounds. First, it limits the Court’s concern to situations in which the
Second, the
arrestee himself could remotely wipe the phone. 107
presumption erroneously concludes that there is “no risk” that the phone
will be wiped. 108
The first point, that the Court should only be concerned with whether
the arrestee himself can remotely wipe the phone, is not based on reality.
The Riley Court correctly notes that the Chimel decision itself was
concerned with the actions of an arrestee. 109 However, the Court has since
broadenedthat approach. Riley’s deviation from that path and its failure to
recognize both the realities of cell phone use and the interconnectedness of
people generally, benefits criminals.
In Maryland v. Buie, the search incident to arrest standard was
modified to respond to a situation in which an individual is arrested within a
home. 110 Recognizing that arrests can be dangerous situations, the Court
affirmed the police’s ability to search for people in closets or other
adjoining spaces from which an attack could be launched. 111 Although this
expansion was based on officer safety, not on evidence destruction, it
demonstrates that the Court is not only concerned with the actions of an
arrestee, but also with the potential actions of others.
This reasoning is worth considering in today’s interconnected world.
People are more connected with one another than ever—often remaining in
constant contact via their devices.112 It is also well documented that
offenders utilize cell phones and other technologies to remain in contact
104. Definition of Remote Wipe, PC MAG, http://pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/66274/remote-wipe
(last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2485–88 (majority opinion) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1969)).
110. See Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990).
111. Id. at 1098–99.
112. See AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 3 (2011),
http://pewinternet.org/files/old-media/files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%Text%20Messaging.pdf
(finding that 83% of Americans own cell phones, 73% of cell phone owners text, and young adults
receive an average of 109.5 texts per day); Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking
Popular Worldwide, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/20/globaldigital-communication-texting-social-networking-popular-worldwide (“[I]n 19 out of 21 countries, a
majority of mobile phone owners regularly send text messages.”).
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with each other. 113 Furthermore, in certain types of cases, such as domestic
violence, prostitution, and human trafficking, offenders may use cell phones
to remain in contact with their victims. 114 In either scenario, when an
offender is arrested, there may be information on the offender’s cell phone
that the offender or others want to remain undiscovered by police. While
the search incident to arrest exception is aimed at the desperate arrestee who
may hide or destroy evidence within his reach due to the arrest, given the
interconnectedness of people, criminal actors, and victims, it is misplaced to
not acknowledge that a desperate cohort may take the same action, triggered
by the same event: the arrest.
More concerning, however, is the Riley Court’s statement that remote
wipes are not “prevalent.” 115 Even at the time of the opinion’s drafting, this
issue was well documented in the lower courts and in mainstream media. 116
While there were differing opinions among the lower courts on the
relevance of the ability to remotely wipe, some courts did justify cell phone
searches because of this capability. 117 Similarly, in 2012, mainstream
media documented that “[a]ll of the major smartphone platforms have some
kind of remote erase capability.” 118 Various media sources list the types of
113. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 842–844 (10th Cir. 1999); People v.
Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 890–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); EOGHAN CASEY & BENJAMIN TURNBULL,
DIGITAL EVIDENCE ON MOBILE DEVICES, in EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER
CRIME ch. 20 (3d ed. 2011), www.booksite.elsevier.com/9780123742681/Chapter_20_Final.pdf; David
Décary-Hétu & Carlo Morselli, Gang Presence in Social Network Sites, 5 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY
876, 878–80 (2011).
114. MARK LATONERO, THE RISE OF MOBILE AND THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED
TRAFFICKING 10 (2012), http://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2012/11/USC-AnnenbergTechnology-and-Human-Trafficking-2012.pdf; Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control
Domestic
Abuse
Victims,
NPR
(Sept.
15,
2014,
4:22
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalkcontrol-domestic-abuse-victims.
115. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014).
116. See Mat Honan, Break Out a Hammer: You’ll Never Believe the Data ‘Wiped’ Smartphones
Store, WIRED (Apr. 1, 2013), www.wired.com/2013/04/smartphone-data-trail; Bob Segall, Cell Phone
Warning: Deleted Personal Information Often Left Behind, WTHR.COM (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:18 PM),
www.wthr.com/story/21419450/cell-phone-warning-deleted-information-often-left-behind.
117. E.g., United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8,
2008) (concluding that a search of a cell phone’s address book and call history was reasonable because,
among other reasons, testimony from law enforcement indicated that the cellular provider enabled
customers to remotely delete all of the information located on the cell phone); United States v. Young,
No. 5:05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13 (N.D. W. Va., May 9, 2006) (holding that exigent
circumstances justified searching a cell phone for text messages when the cell phone had an option for
auto deleting messages after one day).
118. Jamie Lendino, How to Remotely Disable Your Lost or Stolen Phone, PCMAG.COM (Apr. 12,
2012), www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp; see also Smartphone Remote Wiping Feature
Thwarts Secret Service, Law Enforcement, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (May 19, 2010),
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/smartphone-remote-wiping-feature-thwarts-secret-servicelaw-enforcement (“Smartphones such as Blackberry and iPhone offer a remote-wipe feature: if your
phone is lost or stolen, you can remotely erase all the data stored on the phone; this feature protects
one’s privacy, but it also allow the accomplices of criminals and terrorists captured by law enforcement
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phones with remote wiping capability, including all major phones such as
iPhone, Android, Blackberry, and Microsoft. 119 Not only do the phones
have this capability, but mainstream media and manufacturers also
documented step-by-step instructions on how to wipe the devices,
estimating that the time required to do so is approximately five minutes. 120
Therefore, at the time of the Riley opinion, the Court’s notion, that the
capability to remotely wipe a cell phone was not prevalent, was misplaced.
That presumption is even more incorrect today. In recent years the
extent of government surveillance has captured the attention of the
media. 121 In the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden of the
government’s massive data collection efforts, specifically the collection of
data from phone calls, the public’s concern regarding access to data has
increased. 122 Moreover, with the rise of smartphones came a rise in the
theft of these valuable devices. 123 As such, there is an increased consumer
demand for the ability to wipe the data from one’s phone. 124 Phone
manufacturers responded by advertising and marketing this feature. 125 Not
surprisingly, reports of smartphones being remotely wiped while in police
custody followed. 126 Therefore, the notion that this capability is not
prevalent or even a valid issue is misplaced.
The Court in Riley suggests that one reason remote wiping is not a
problem is because of law enforcement’s ability to protect cell phones from
remote wiping by the use of a Faraday bag or another similar product that

remotely to erase all incriminating and intelligence-relevant data from the suspect’s phone before the
police can access it.”).
119. See Lendino, supra note 118; Perform a Remote Wipe on a Mobile Phone, MICROSOFT
TECHNET, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Aa998614(v=EXCHG.150).aspx (last modified
Feb. 6, 2013).
120. See, e.g., Jerry Hildenbrand, Hands-on With the Android Device Manager Remote Wipe
Feature, ANDROIDCENTRAL (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:12 PM), www.androidcentral.com/hands-android-devicemanager-remote-wipe-feature; Lendino, supra note 118; iCloud: Erase Your Device, APPLE,
https://support.apple. com/kb/PH2701?locale=en_US (last modified Aug. 26, 2015).
121. See Bruce Schneier, What’s Next in Government Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015),
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/whats-next-in-government-surveillance/385667/.
122. MADDEN, supra note 71.
123. See, e.g., Dana Hedgpeth, iPhone ‘Snatch and Grab’ Thefts on Metro Rise, WASH. POST (Mar.
25, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/WP/2014/03/25/thefts-of-electronic-devices-onmetro-rise.
124. See Donna Tapellini, Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million in 2013, CONSUMER REPS. (May
28, 2014, 4:00 PM), www.consumerreports.com/org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-rose-to-3-1million-last-year.htm.
125. See sources cited supra note 120.
126. See Brief for Respondent at 9–10, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132)
(documenting cases of phones being wiped after arrest); Zack Whittaker, Smartphones ‘Remotely
Wiped’ in Police Custody, as Encryption vs. Law Enforcement Heats Up, ZDNET.COM (Oct. 9, 2014),
www.zdnet.com/article/smartphones-remotely-wiped-in-police-custody-as-encryption-vs-lawenforcement-heats-up.
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can prevent the cell phone from receiving a signal.127 While the Court is
correct that Faraday bags provide a technological advantage, the Court’s
overreliance on the existence of such technologies to dismiss legitimate
concerns reflects a gap between the Court’s experience and the realities
facing law enforcement. 128
A Faraday bag or cage is a container in which law enforcement can
place a cell phone after seizing to prevent it from receiving a signal from a
phone network or Bluetooth. 129 These bags are designed to prevent remote
access. 130 They are manufactured by several companies and marketed to
law enforcement to combat cybercrime and retain evidence.131 They vary in
size, quality, and capability. 132
After presuming that remote wiping was not prevalent, the Court in
Riley went on to assert that, even if it were, the police could overcome it by
simply either disconnecting the cell phone or using a Faraday bag, which it
referred to as a “cheap” and “easy” solution.133 The many sub-assumptions
in this analysis underscore the gap between the pressures on today’s law
enforcement and the Court’s perception of their capabilities.134
The Court’s suggestion that law enforcement disconnect the cell phone
ignores the obligations on law enforcement to avoid compromising the
integrity of the evidence. 135 Disconnecting or turning off the cell phone
may indeed alter it in ways that compromise its integrity. 136
More importantly, the Court’s characterization of the Faraday bag as a
foolproof solution is misplaced. While certainly a positive technological
development, the Court’s reliance on Faraday bags as a flawless solution
and dismissal of criticism is of concern. 137 While some Faraday bags are
large and allow police to work on and manipulate the cell phone while it
remains inside the bag or box by using a clear window, others are not. 138
127. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014).
128. See supra notes 115–127 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Department of
Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, “Awareness Brief: Find My iPhone”);
United States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d 808, 815 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
130. See Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
131. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
132. See, e.g., Faraday Pouches and Bags, ARROWHEAD FORENSICS, www.crime-scene.com/store/
faraday.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (selling Faraday containers from $21.00 to $250.00); Faraday
Bags, EDEC, https://www.edecdf.com/product-category/faraday-bags/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
133. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
134. See id. at 2486–89.
135. See id. at 2487.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012); RICK AYERS ET
AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES ON MOBILE DEVICE
FORENSICS (DRAFT) 30 (2013), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/research/upload/draft-guidelines-onmobile-device-forensics.pdf.
137. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
138. See sources cited supra note 132.
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Generally, a Faraday bag is only useful so long as a cell phone is within
it. 139 A targeted remote wipe by an offender’s ally, who could be constantly
searching for the phone’s signal to take advantage of its briefest removal
from the bag, is possible. Even if the cell phone is inside of a Faraday bag,
the risk of improperly sealing the container is real and could lead to cell
phone access to a cell network. 140 Additionally, “Faraday containers . . .
[do] not necessarily eliminate [radio signals] completely, allowing the
possibility of communications being established with a cell tower, if in its
immediate vicinity.” 141
The Court did not consider further information, which undermines its
conclusions that the arrestee himself is not a threat and that Faraday bags
resolve any real threat of remote wiping. 142 Some wiping of data occurs
internally. 143 For instance, a person may alter the data on their phone
through a so-called logic bomb. 144 A logic bomb is an alteration that is
internally set up on a cell phone to activate if certain conditions are not
met. 145 For example, a logic bomb may require the entry of a certain
sequence of numbers into a cell phone at specific time intervals.146 If that
condition does not occur, the cell phone will destroy its own internal
data. 147 Some cell phones are configured with “geo-fencing” that will
automatically wipe the data when the phone leaves a certain geographic
area. 148 A Faraday bag may not prevent the use of this technique, which the
arrestee himself would cause. 149 Additionally, Faraday bags do nothing to
prevent preprogrammed deletions such as those associated with Snapchat
and TigerText. 150 Furthermore, when a cell phone is in a Faraday bag, its
battery life decreases because it is constantly searching for a network. 151
Continued failure to connect to a network “may cause certain mobile

139. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
140. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136.
141. Id.; ERIC KATZ, A FIELD TEST OF MOBILE SHIELD DEVICES 1–2 (2010),
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/techmasters/33/.
142. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
143. See Eamon P. Doherty, The Need for a Faraday Bag, DFI NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:44 AM),
www.forensicmag.com/articles/2014/02/need-faraday-bag.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136, at 31.
149. Id. at 30–31.
150. Adam M. Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data Extraction Devices,
Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search Problem, 22 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 608 (2013); Sean Gallagher, Update: Boeing’s Black—This Android Phone
Will Self-Destruct, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:01 PM), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2014/02/boeings-black-this-android-phone-will-self-destruct/.
151. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136.
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devices to reset or clear network data that otherwise would be useful if
recovered.” 152
Moreover, the Court’s presumption that Faraday bags are “cheap” is
not as simple as it may seem. 153 Such a label turns on quality. 154 While it is
true that some Faraday bags cost a few dollars on the Internet, some exceed
The cost of professional Faraday bags aimed at law
$500.00. 155
enforcement markets can range from approximately $58.00 to hundreds of
dollars. 156 Concluding that Faraday bags are a viable solution for modern
law enforcement presupposes a number of facts.
First, the Court assumes adequate funding exists to equip police
officers to carry such bags on their person and immediately place a
recovered cell phone into the bag upon arrest. Although it is recommended
that law enforcement use such devices, the presumption that every police
department can do so may be overly optimistic. 157 Most police departments
are small and underfunded, not large, well-funded operations with the
money to purchase Faraday bags for the 13.5 million arrests that take place
annually in the United States. 158 Furthermore, most of those arrests take
place in small police departments. 159
Notwithstanding the image of police departments projected by the
media, approximately one-half (49%) of local law enforcement agencies
employ less than ten officers, 24% employ less than five officers, and 4.9%
have just one officer. 160 While the correlation is not perfect, it would stand
to reason that small police departments perform several million arrests
annually. Although some small police departments encourage the use of
Faraday bags, it is not likely that all small departments receive funding for
enough Faraday bags of the requisite quality, and it is even less likely that
these departments have a forensic department to examine the device.161
152. Id.
153. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014).
154. See Black Hole Data Bag, EDEC, https://www.edecdf.com/promo/vector-bags/index.php (last
visited Oct. 11, 2015).
155. Id.; Faraday Pouches and Bags, supra note 134.
156. Faraday Pouches and Bags, supra note 134; Black Hole Data Bag, supra note 154.
157. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136.
158. Crime in the United States, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/
data/table_29.html (last updated Sept. 2010).
159. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES 2 (May 2015), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf. Fifty-seven percent of
sheriffs’ offices employ less than twenty-five sworn personnel, and twenty-five percent employ less than
ten deputies. ANDREA M. BURCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SHERIFFS’ OFFICES, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES
2 (Dec. 2012), www.bjs.gov/index/cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4555.
161. See Lucian McCarty, Forensic Frenzy: Higher Demand Being Placed on State Crime Labs,
SARATOGIAN (May 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.saratogian.com/general-news/20130511/forensicfrenzy-higher-demand-being-placed-on-state-crime-labs. If history is any lesson, police departments of
all sizes struggle to keep up with the technical demands placed upon them. See id. For example,
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Many police departments have to apply for federal funding to obtain
equipment such as bulletproof vests. 162 The ability to buy Faraday bags and
cages would likely be less of a priority. 163 Some rural departments report
that this requirement will strain their budgets, and instead are trying to
improvise with microwaves. 164 While the Riley Court indicated the use of
aluminum foil as a viable replacement for Faraday bags, this too presents
some challenges. 165
There is little doubt that Faraday bags are a technological
advancement. Compelling cases have been made that their use by law
enforcement can provide a way in which cell phones can be preserved prior
to obtaining a warrant. 166 This Article’s concern is more on the Court’s
overreliance on these bags to dismiss any concerns and to draw sweeping
conclusions.
The Court’s presumption differs significantly from reality. This is not
to say that Faraday bags are irrelevant. They certainly are an advantage for
law enforcement and an important method to preserve evidence. It is the
Court’s overreliance on them to dismiss valid concerns that is troubling.
This presumption that remote wiping is not a threat, or that Faraday bags

forensic examinations of computers take time and examiners. Id. The nation experienced a significant
backlog in keeping up with them, and even the FBI experienced a significant backlog in processing its
forensic evidence. See OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S EFFORTS TO COMBAT CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 29 (2009),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0908/final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN] (finding hundreds of digital evidence cases waiting for processing and a nine month delay);
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LABORATORY’S
FORENSIC
DNA
CASE
BACKLOG
I
(2012),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/a1239.pdf (indicating a total of 403 backlogged forensic DNA
cases). This is due to several obstacles, many of which have to do with funding. Even when local or
more rural departments can benefit from a state-wide lab, the backlog can be lengthy due to cost. See,
e.g., McCarty, supra. The same is true for the examination of rape kits, with an estimated 400,000 of
them never examined. Nora Caplan-Bricker, The Backlog of 400,000 Unprocessed Rape Kits Is a
Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116945/rape-kitsbacklog-joe-biden-announces-35-million-reopen-cases. While many local police departments rely on
federal supplemental funding, that has also been the subject of budget cuts. See generally NAT’L
CRIMINAL JUST. ASS’N & VERA INST. OF JUST., THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL BUDGET CUTS ON STATE AND
LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY (2012), http://www.ncja.org/sites/default/files/documents/NCJA-VERASummar-of-Sequestration-Survey-2012.pdf (indicating decreased federal funding to criminal justice
stakeholder organizations).
162. See Paige Kelton, JSO Was Denied Federal Grant to Buy Bulletproof Vests, ACTIONNEWSJAX
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:15 PM) (noting that even larger police departments do not receive funds for vests).
163. See id.
164. See George Graham, Greenfield Police Turn to Microwave Ovens as Improvised Faraday
Cages as Department Adjusts to U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Warrants for Cell Phone
(July
11,
2014,
3:09
PM),
Searches,
MASSLIVE
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/07/greenfield_ police_turn_to_micr.html.
165. See KATZ, supra note 141, at 32 (discussing shielding issues); Gershowitz, supra note 150, at
609 (arguing foil is a viable alternative).
166. Gershowitz, supra note 150.
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resolve all the issues, reflects a lack of understanding of the technical uses
of cell phones, as well as the real demands of modern policing.
2. Presumption 2: The Threat of Encryption Is Not a Significant Threat to
Evidence Preservation
Distinct from remote wiping, encryption is a method of making data
unreadable by others. 167 Many forms of encryption exist, but the Riley
Court used it to describe situations beyond password protection when a
phone locks and its “data becomes protected by sophisticated encryption
that renders a phone all but ‘unbreakable’ unless police know the
password.” 168 The Riley Court did note that the arguments regarding
encryption were not made in the lower courts, but went on to indicate that
encryption was not a significant problem due to two factors. 169 First, the
Court again assumed it was not a prevalent practice; it recognized that the
capability could be found only on “some modern” cell phones. 170 Second,
it concluded that the problem can be “fully prevented” by a Faraday bag or
disabling the feature before it locks the device. 171 The Court again asserted
that data encryption is not an action of the arrestee, but the “ordinary
operation of a phone’s security features” and, therefore, is not relevant to
the search incident to arrest scenario. 172
As with remote wiping, this concern about active evidence destruction
is misplaced, as is the Court’s narrow focus only on spontaneous (as
opposed to pre-planned) active efforts to destroy evidence. 173 United States
v. Robinson made clear that the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement needed no further justification. 174 Police need not
believe that the arrestee is actively destroying evidence to conduct a search
incident to arrest. 175 It is only the risk that destruction could occur that
allows police to search. Therefore, the fact that police do not see arrestees
actively destroying the evidence on their phones upon arrest seems less
critical than the Court suggests in Riley. 176

167.
168.
11.).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

United States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d. 808, 816 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p.
Id. at 2486–87.
Id. at 2486.
Id. at 2486–87.
Id. at 2486.
See id. at 2486–87.
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
See id. at 228–29.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
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More troubling is the Court’s suggestion that encryption is only
available on a few phones. 177 This presumption is simply incorrect because
virtually all major cell phone models have, or will have, this capability.
“Content encryption capabilities are offered as a standard feature in many
mobile devices or may be available through add-on applications.” 178 This
was the case for most cell phones for several years.179 For example,
Android phones have had this feature since 2011. 180 Apple’s products have
been capable of encryption since 2009. 181 What has changed between 2011
and the present day is twofold. First, encryption features are now a default
setting and the capability to wipe cell phones comes standard. 182 Second, in
the past, law enforcement could access cell phone data under certain
circumstances. 183 It could do so through a so-called back door. 184 This is
no longer the case. 185 Moreover, even at the time of Riley’s announcement,
numerous Internet sites and media outlets offered “simple” instructions on
how to encrypt data on one’s cell phone. 186
Not only were the Court’s presumptions inaccurate in 2014, the year
Riley was announced, they are certainly no more true today. In 2015, the
Washington Post accurately described the state of the field as follows:
Both [Apple and Google] have now embraced a form of encryption that in
most cases will make it impossible for law enforcement officials to collect
evidence from smartphones — even when authorities get legally binding
187
warrants.

This was not an overstatement because all major cell phone companies
provide phones with the ability to encrypt data with no back door way that
allows access to law enforcement. 188
In September 2014, Apple announced that its phones and other
products would feature such a high level of encryption that Apple itself will
“lack the technical ability to unlock the phones or recover data for
177. See id.
178. AYERS ET AL., supra note 138, at 24.
179. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
180. Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking
Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18
/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/.
181. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136, at 43.
182. See Tim Shiesser, The FBI Slams Smartphone Encryption Because There’s No Backdoor,
TECHSPOT (Sept. 26, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.techspot.com/news/58204-the-fbi-slams-smartphoneencryption-because-theres-no-backdoor.html.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
187. Timberg, supra note 180.
188. Supra notes 169–186 and accompanying text.
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anyone—whether it be for police or even users themselves.” 189 Google
followed suit, announcing that its next version of its operating system
would require all new phones to have full-disc encryption “enabled by
default out of the box” as a standard feature. 190 While Google has not been
able to fully implement this vision, it has not been due to a change of
priority, but rather, it is due to performance issues. 191 It continues the
course to do so.
The significance of these actions is that the most popular operating
system in the world (Android) will have this encryption capability. 192
Furthermore, because Apple controls both the hardware and software of its
products, it can implement this feature on not only its new products, but
also on older products, which update their operating system to enable them
to not only be encrypted, but to have lockable encryption. 193
Weakening the Court’s presumption that few phones have this
capability is the reality that not only do these companies offer this feature—
they market based on it. For example, Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, wrote an
open letter to Apple users stating that Apple “respect[s] your privacy and
protect[s] it with strong encryption, plus strict policies.” 194 Apple has
further advertised itself as actively thwarting government efforts to obtain
data, noting on its website that “[i]n its latest Who Has Your Back? report,
the [Electronic Frontier Foundation] awarded Apple 5 out of 5 stars for our
commitment to standing with our customers when the government seeks
access to their data.” 195
Not surprisingly, this has caused great concern among law
enforcement and national security figures. 196 In response to Apple’s
announcement of the data encryption in iOS 8, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) expressed that it was “‘very concerned’ about new steps
Silicon Valley tech giants were taking to strengthen privacy protections on
mobile devices.” 197 While FBI Director, James Comey, has acknowledged
189. Timberg, supra note 180.
190. Andrew Cunningham, Google Quietly Backs Away from Encrypting New Lollipop Devices by
Default, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/03/googlequietly-backs-away-from-encrypting-new-lollipop-devices-by-default/.
191. See id.
192. See Timberg, supra note 180.
193. See id.
194. Apple’s Commitment to Your Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Oct.
11, 2015) (emphasis added).
195. Privacy: Government Information Requests, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/
government-information-requests/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (emphasis added).
196. See Igor Bobic & Ryan J. Reilly, FBI Director James Comey ‘Very Concerned’ About New
POST
(Sept.
25,
2014),
Apple
Google
Privacy
Features,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/25/james-comey-apple-encryption_n_5882874.html (quoting
FBI Director James Comey).
197. Id.
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the valid concern regarding protecting phones from being compromised, he
has objected strongly to the aforementioned marketing techniques, which he
characterized as advertising “something expressly to allow people to place
themselves beyond the law[,] . . . market[ing] a closet that could never be
opened.” 198
Similarly, Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency, has
also acknowledged a legitimate concern about privacy, but openly criticized
a “no back door” approach. 199 He advocates as a compromise that
companies create a key that can open any system to access pictures or texts,
but divide the key into pieces, such that no one entity could access all of the
data. 200 He argues not for a “back door,” but for a “front door” with
multiple, strong locks that will protect individuals but also allow access for
the government when needed. 201 This “split-key approach” has been the
subject of debate in the public sphere with many identifying potential
weaknesses, including some vulnerability to hackers and issues regarding
key storage. 202
This debate is a real one occurring in the public sphere. The ability of
cell phone encryption and the complete inability of law enforcement to
access cellphone data are well documented. “[I]n the wake of widespread
government surveillance and increasingly serious privacy breaches by
people with malicious intent, it looks like tech companies will continue to
close down ways to access private data, even if that means shutting off
access from law enforcement agencies.” 203
Yet the Court incorrectly presumes that encryption is a minor problem
for law enforcement on only a small number of cell phones. 204 Such a
presumption was incorrect at the time it was made, and has become even
more misplaced as technologies develop. 205 Thus, the presumption underlying Riley’s rejection of this concern undermines the outcome of the case.
The same is true for the Court’s suggestion that Faraday bags,
although an incomplete solution, are a reasonable response. 206 It is difficult
to imagine how a Faraday bag will preserve data if the encryption is
automatic and there is no way to break the code. Furthermore, the Riley

198. Id.
199. Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples with Clash
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2015),
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-worries-aboutaccess-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7clc7518-d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Shiesser, supra note 182.
204. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486–87 (2014).
205. See Shiesser, supra note 182.
206. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
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opinion is rather circular on this point. On the one hand, the Court
advocates for obtaining access to the phone and disabling the encryption
feature prior to its activation. 207 On the other hand, the Court notes that a
search incident to arrest is not a solution to encryption because there is
simply not enough time to pay attention to a cell phone during the heat of
an arrest. 208
Finally, the Court suggests that much of the information will be saved
to the cloud and is thus available for access via a warrant.209 However, one
merely need not have their phone set up to back up to the cloud—not an
unreasonable action for a criminal—to circumvent that solution. This
brings one to the final presumption discussed in this Article, which regards
warrants.
3. Presumption 3: “Just Get a Warrant”
The Riley Court concludes its decision with the following statement:
“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” 210
Embedded within this “simple” statement is the presumption that obtaining
a warrant is possible. The Court notes that obtaining a warrant is easier
today than it was previously due to the use of technology to speed along the
process. 211 But this quip invites the obvious questions: A warrant for what?
A warrant served upon whom?
If the warrant is to search the cell phone, what is the utility of the
warrant if the concern was remote wiping? In that scenario, there is nothing
to search.
Similarly, no one, including the manufacturer or law
enforcement, can access an encrypted phone.212 Indeed, as Tim Cook
advertised to Apple users, one of the very purposes of encrypting its cell
phones is to thwart government access. 213 Therefore, a warrant for an
encrypted phone is equally as anemic and ineffectual. While in Great
Britain there may be a law that requires a suspect to disclose his password,
the Fifth Amendment precludes this from being the case in the United

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 2486–87.
Id. at 2487.
Id. at 2491–92.
Id. at 2495.
See id. at 2493.
See supra text accompanying notes 167–168.
See supra text accompanying note 195.
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States. 214 Thus, routine remote wiping of cell phones can create a
measurable effect on the most legitimate methods of evidence collection. 215
Even if law enforcement could establish that information was actually
available, the next obstacle would be identifying on whom they should
As discussed previously, many cell phone
serve the warrant. 216
manufacturers and operating system developers have taken steps to actively
thwart law enforcement efforts. 217 They actually advertise their inability to
comply with a law enforcement request:
Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore
cannot access this data. So it’s not technically feasible for us to respond to
government warrants for the extraction of this data from devices in their
218
possession running iOS 8.

Although much of the data could stay on the iCloud and be accessible
through a warrant, programming the cell phone to not back up to the iCloud
easily prevents such access. 219 The reality is that a warrant will not assist
law enforcement if the information sought is not accessible.220
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court has made a determination of what is a reasonable
search incident to an arrest and concluded, in this instance, that it is
reasonable for law enforcement to obtain warrants. 221 However, the Court
based this conclusion in some part on incorrect or flawed presumptions—
either due to its own gap between reality and experience, or the inability of
any judicial institution to keep pace with rapidly changing technologies. 222
While the Riley holding itself may not be incorrect (it may be that the level
of intrusion outweighs the government interest), it exemplifies an approach
to solving complicated issues that occur at the intersection of the Fourth

214. See United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (indicating that the
government cannot compel a defendant to reveal his password because it would “communicate[ a]
factual assertion to the government and thus, is testimonial.”).
215. See supra Part IV.B.1.
216. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(a) (discussing that after a judge issues a warrant, the warrant must
identify the person or property to be searched).
217. See supra notes 194–195.
218. Jay McGregor, Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode, FORBES (Sept. 18,
2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-withunbreakable-passcode (quoting Apple CEO Tim Cook regarding its privacy policy).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
222. See supra Part III.
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Amendment, privacy, and technology that is problematic. 223 The Court’s
approach is problematic because it precludes the evolution of long-term
jurisprudence in an area of the law that critically needs guidance.224 This
development is hindered in the same way a house built on sand can never
be sturdy. The Riley decision will not withstand the test of time, as its basis
is compromised from the beginning.
To be sure, there are some who do not regard this as problematic at
all. 225 There are valid criticisms of the notion that the government should
have a right to access cell phone data.226 Indeed, safe manufacturers are not
required to include in construction a way the government can always use to
enter a safe and read the papers stored therein. 227 It is a legitimate argument
that cell phone manufacturers should not be made to do so either. Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority in Riley, quite rightly notes that “[p]rivacy
comes at a cost.” 228 Moreover, many of the extreme examples of abusive
police searches, mentioned in amici and in the majority opinion, could
indeed occur in an unrestrained, blanket search of cell phones. However,
the Court’s approach continues to be problematic on both a practical and
philosophical level. 229
A. Riley Exemplifies Practical Shortfalls
Riley demonstrates some of the practical problems that arise from the
judicial digital divide. 230 Many cases exist in the middle ground between
the two alternatives the Court mentions. 231 The Court dwells on two
extremes. First, it expresses concern about the extreme invasion of privacy
a nefarious law enforcement official could engage in if he actually sought to
violate an individual’s privacy. 232 The Court also asserts that no significant
harm will result from its ruling because in some cases an exigency will exist
that relieves the requirement of a warrant. 233

223. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473 (discussing Fourth Amendment and privacy concerns
regarding digital data stored on cell phones).
224. See supra Part III.B.
225. See Leary, Missed Opportunity, supra note 4, at 351.
226. See Shiesser, supra note 182.
227. See United States v. Castro, No. 88-3044, 1989 WL 42903, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1989).
228. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493; see also id. at 2491 (“[T]he Founders did not fight a revolution
to gain the right to government agency protocols.”).
229. See discussion infra Part V.A–B.
230. See supra Part IV.
231. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 786 N.W.2d 463, 472 (Wis. 2010).
232. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492. (“It would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law
enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any
crime could be found on a cell phone.”).
233. See id. at 2487.
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Such a perspective further illustrates a gap in the Court’s
understanding of both the reality of modern policing and the role of some
technologies in modern life and criminality. 234 These cases involve neither
extreme exigencies, which would merit a warrantless search, nor police
abuse. But they do involve a serious type of case in which a cell phone,
given its ubiquity in modern life, likely contains available and important
evidence. For example, in sex trafficking cases, the offenders are often
some of the most brutal: engaging in torture-like tactics to buy and sell
women and children into lives of slavery. 235 It is well documented that
such offenders stay in contact with and keep control over their victims
through digital devices and technologies such as GPS, texting, etc. 236
Furthermore, they are often interconnected to other members of their
trafficking organization, and utilize cell phones to arrange purchases. 237 In
a case in which a purchaser or co-trafficker is arrested, the cell phone may
be the only lead to the trafficker.238 While there may be reason to search
the phone, there is not an exigency on the level of what Chief Justice
Roberts demands in Riley. 239 Under the current regime, a regime based on
false premises, this criminal’s phone cannot be accessed in a timely manner,
and perhaps the only avenue to a perpetrator is lost.
B. Riley Exemplifies and Contributes to a More Profound Problem
This leads to the philosophical objection to this false-premise approach
unaddressed by the Court in Riley, notwithstanding it furthered the current
regime. Currently, the very same commercial entities that created a climate
in which massive amounts of data are collected, but the government cannot
access, are profiting from it.
The atmosphere around digital data has changed. The Edward
Snowden leaks revealed previously unknown government surveillance of
Americans’ data. 240 The public has also learned of several unauthorized
234. See supra Part III.
235. See Michael J. Frank & G. Zachary Terwilliger, Gang-Controlled Sex Trafficking, 3 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 342, 364 (2015); Press Release, U.S. Attorney Dist. Md., New York Pimp Conviction in
Maryland Sex Trafficking and Gun Crimes (May 8, 2013), www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/new-yorkpimp-convicted-maryland-sex-trafficking-and-gun-crimes.
236. See Pimp-Controlled Online Advertisement, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/
topics/332-sex-trafficking-pimp-controlled-online-advertisement (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (documenting how trafficker monitored victim through cell phone).
237. See United States v. Nyuon, No. CR. 12-40017-01-KES, 2013 WL 1338192, at *1 (D.S.D.
Mar. 29, 2013); Chamberlain v. Marshall, No. SACV 08-1468-AG (MLG), 2009 WL 2392093, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); LATONERO, supra note 114.
238. Nyuon, 2013 WL 1338192, at *1.
239. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
240. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The 10 Biggest Revelations From Edward Snowden’s
Leaks, MASHABLE (June 4, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/06/05/edward-snowden-revelations.
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hacks into iCloud accounts, 241 corporate databases, 242 and government
databases. 243 Consequently, customers and individuals are pushing back
against companies that acted in concert with the government during its
surveillance efforts. 244 This is arguably a positive development for
individuals seeking to control their privacy.
The resulting regime, however, is a fiction. The very companies that
advertise they protect customer privacy from the government collect
personal identifying information and aggregated data on their customers,
often without their meaningful, voluntary consent, and sell it to private
entities. 245 For example, Apple is a defendant in a class action suit alleging
that it collected personal identifying information on some of its customers
on one of its commercial platforms. 246 While Apple claims to protect its
customers’ privacy from the government, its own terms of use state that it
“reserve[s] the right to ‘make certain . . . information available to strategic
partners.’” 247
Similarly, Google combines information about its customers across
services and platforms, and stores the information indefinitely. 248 It has
stated that “[w]hen you use our services or view content provided by
Google, we automatically collect and store certain information in server
logs.” 249
The result of such a regime is that these companies play a role in
creating this conundrum faced by the courts. They have designed a world
in which companies have unrestrained access to information from
individuals—often taken without any meaningful consent by the individual.
They collect, house, and sell the information so that the only entity without
241. See, e.g., James Cook, Hackers Just Released a Tool That Could Threaten Everyone’s iCloud
Account, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2015, 7:38 AM), http://businessinsider.com/hacker-tool-for-icloudaccount-2015-1.
242. See, e.g., Shelly Banjo, Home Depot Hackers Exposed 53 Million Email Addresses, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 6, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://wsj.com/articles/home-depot-hackers-used-password-stolenfrom-vendor-1415309252; Charles Riley & Jose Pagliery, Target Will Pay Hack Victims $10 Million,
CNN MONEY (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:05 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/19/technology/security/targetdata-hack-settlement.
243. See, e.g., Mike Levine, OPM Hack Far Deeper Than Publicly Acknowledged, Went
Undetected for More Than a Year, Sources Say, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2015, 4:59 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/politics/opm-hack-deeper-publicly-acknowledged-undetected-yearsources/story?id=31689059.
244. See Gregory Wallace, Lawsuits Piling Up On Target Over Hack, CNN MONEY (Dec. 24, 2013,
11:17 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/23/news/companies/target-credit-card-lawsuits.
245. See Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof, supra note 4, at 343–56.
246. See Apple Customer Data Collection Class Action Lawsuit, BIGCLASSACTION.COM,
http://bigclassaction.com/lawsuit/Apple-data-collection-lawsuit.php (last updated Jan. 22, 2014).
247. Id.
248. Mark Milian, Google to Merge User Data Across its Services, CNN (Jan. 25, 2012, 8:18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/tech/web/google-privacy-policy.
249. Welcome to the Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, www.google.com/policies/privacy (last
modified Aug. 19, 2015) (emphasis added).
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access to it is the government. 250 This sort of legal fiction turns privacy on
its head. Not only does privacy come at a cost, as Chief Justice Roberts
argues, but it creates an illogical framework. 251 Because the citizenry is
pushing back against a loss of privacy, it seems the only manageable target
is law enforcement’s access to private information. The result is a system
in which only law enforcement is precluded from accessing information
when the real threat to privacy is commercial entities.
VI. THE FUTURE
A factor driving this perverse world in which individuals have no
actual privacy from commercial entities, but these same entities conspire
with individuals to preclude an underfunded police department from
accessing personal information, is cell phone technology itself. Our
technological environment is rapidly changing, and thus it is difficult for
courts to develop rules that are responsive to the realities of the
modern-day. But the Court’s response that law enforcement simply needs
to work harder, based on flawed presumptions, seems an inadequate
remedy. 252 Conversely, the notion that the government has a right of access
to vast quantities of information simply because it exists is equally as
problematic.
Chief Justice Roberts correctly notes that “the Founders did not fight a
revolution” for the right to protocols. 253 But the Founders also did not fight
a revolution to prevent police from effectively investigating crime because
their hands are tied by commercial conditioning and courts’ misapplied
presumptions.
Several suggestions exist to address cell phone search situations.
While none are perfect, when analyzed by the Court, they should not be
critiqued and ultimately rejected based on false presumptions. For
example, the Riley Court rejected applying the Arizona v. Gant approach to
cell phones. 254 In Gant, the Court held that police may only conduct a
search of a vehicle incident to arrest when either the arrestee is unsecured or
there is reason to believe the vehicle holds evidence of the crime of
arrest. 255 The Riley Court rejected Gant’s compromise approach because of
the unique characteristics of automobiles, namely the driver’s decreased
expectation of privacy and the heightened need for prompt law enforcement
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searches. 256 That presumption, however, was again incorrect. Research of
Americans’ expectations of privacy reveals that the majority of Americans
feel their information is not private from the government or private
companies. 257 Similarly, just as in a car search, there is a heightened need
for government searches of cell phones because the information is fleeting.
The Court in Riley acknowledged the types of information available
in a cell phone. 258 Given the aforementioned discussion of encryption and
remote wiping, this information is also fleeting. 259 As Chief Justice Roberts
reiterated for the majority in Riley, the focus of the Court’s analysis should
be on the data within the phone, not the phone itself. 260 That data, like the
evidence in the vehicle in Gantz, is equally fleeting. 261
Therefore, the Court’s rejection of the Gant approach was again based
on a digital divide between the Court’s perception of the nature of the
information on a cell phone and the reality. Such frameworks do not move
Fourth Amendment privacy protections forward.
Other solutions exist. Many of these are imperfect. They include
some exceptions to the warrant requirement, 262 but they fall short of the
search incident to arrest exception's preference for clear rules and
requirement of a warrant. This approach is almost analogous to the
automobile exception, which would build upon the fleeting nature of the
cell phone evidence. 263 The problem with this approach is that the Court
rejected a similar analogy between luggage and automobiles in Chadwick v.
United States 264and rejected the automatic, albeit slow, destruction of
evidence produced by blood-alcohol dissipation in Missouri v. McNeely. 265
Another possible course for the Court is to follow the suggestion of
the majority in Riley and loosen exigency restrictions. 266 This approach,
however, would lead to unpredictability and a lack of consistency. Others
have noted that mirroring phones would solve the problem. 267 But, given
the number of police departments without adequate funds, pursuing such a
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plan poses other negatives. 268 Finally, the Author argues elsewhere that
limiting the commercial availability of information may protect people from
law enforcement obtaining it. 269
The proper remedy for cell phone searches incident to arrest exceeds
the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the systemic falterings of
the Court’s currently flawed approach. That is, the more significant
concern is the one with broad effects.
Many social norms change over time. The social norm of privacy, and
what is reasonable to expect regarding it, changes rapidly and continuously.
Fueled by technological advances, differing experiences, and diverse views
of digital life, changes in expectations around privacy are even more
complex. In the middle of this ever-transforming world, the Court finds
itself tasked with the challenge of determining what is reasonable. 270 This
is a challenge that must be answered effectively because individuals, law
enforcement, and lower courts need principle-based guidance.
While no simple solution exists to this complex problem, steps can be
taken. Primary among them is working to address and close the judicial
digital divide. This can be done by not only actions of the judiciary, but
also by all stakeholders interested in a long-term jurisprudence.
Heeding to the repeated counsel of Justice Alito, who seems to see this
challenge most clearly, can address this gap. 271 In Jones, he recognized the
turbulent landscape that digital advances create and called upon the
legislature to act. 272 Regarding technology, he insightfully noted:
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in
popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff
273
worthwhile.

Then in Riley, he expanded upon this point:
In light of these developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts
using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures,
elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and

268. See Graham, supra note 164 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s ruling requiring police to
obtain search warrants before searching cell phones strained the police department’s budget).
269. Leary, Missed Opportunity, supra note 4, at 331.
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respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost
274
certainly will take place in the future.

Therefore, the first step in removing the judicial digital divide is addressing
it. One way to address it is to relieve the Court from some of the challenge
because it is not well suited as an institution to address these issues.
Legislatures must act. This branch of government is most able to
assess privacy considerations and is most equipped to understand the
demands and constraints on local law enforcement. As such, legislatures
are more likely able to accurately measure a reasonable balance between the
two.
Justice Alito astutely notes, however, that the Fourth Amendment is
not the best instrument for regulating privacy. 275 Legislatures should also
heed this counsel and understand that the failure to regulate private
industries’ collection and sale of personal data has profound consequences.
It creates a climate in which individuals feel they have no privacy and then
turn to courts to regain control. But those court cases are often criminal,
and the desire for control over privacy can only target the government, not
the entities that are the greatest threat to privacy. This nuance leads to the
incongruous result that allows private industries to invade privacy and
access information readily available to them, whereas law enforcement—
who arguably has a legitimate need to do so at times—is artificially
cordoned off from doing so.
Not all issues, however, can be resolved legislatively. In fact, the
Fourth Amendment exists so that individuals are not left at the mercy of a
government that is insensitive to privacy concerns. Here, other stakeholders
can work to close the gap. Litigants must present evidence and expert
information regarding the details and capabilities of technology, both
current and expected. That is not to say that Fourth Amendment issues
should be resolved based on technology. That is not the case. A court can
offer principles consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only after
a full understanding of the technology’s uses and effects on law
enforcement and the government. Therefore, lower courts, faced with busy
dockets and numerous motions to suppress, must develop the record in this
way for appellate courts.
Appellate courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court must have full
information regarding these issues as part of the cases before them, so that
the gap between their experience and modern-day life can close. Some of
that responsibility falls upon appellate courts to seek out the creation of a
full record. These courts should invite specific amici to develop briefing on
274. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
275. See id.
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the technology and the increasing challenges it brings, as well as the actual
abilities of law enforcement to accomplish the tasks faced with these
challenges. 276 An understanding of the technology is insufficient if it does
not accompany an understanding of how offenders utilize it, how citizens
perceive it, and how law enforcement can respond to it. Courts must not
wait for amicus parties to come forward. Then the Court is left to sort out
the facts based on what others framed the issue to be. Rather, to close the
gap, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, must invite parties to
brief on precise issues to gain an unbiased and balanced understanding of
technology and its impacts. While litigants must create the factual record
for the appellate process, as Justice Black noted, “[m]ost of the cases before
this Court involve matters that affect far more people than the immediate
record parties.” 277 They also affect far more people than those with views
expressed by interest groups with the funding and time to inject their
interest into a case.
These measures may close the judicial digital divide and the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area may sit on more solid and long-standing footing.
Until that time, privacy will likely continue to erode and law enforcement’s
efforts to fulfill its function will remain artificially handicapped.
VII. CONCLUSION
The role of technology in everyday life is increasing at every
moment. 278 This allows people to utilize technology in new ways,
integrating it into the norms of daily living. 279 Technology also allows
criminals more access to victims and law enforcement more avenues of
investigation. 280 Consequently, when the government is seeking to execute
its duties of crime control and investigation, it should take great caution to
prevent law enforcement from intruding into private, protected information.
Similarly, criminal elements should not be enabled to take advantage of all
the benefits this technology creates without law enforcement norms also
being adjusted for this new reality.
What is reasonable is a measure for the judiciary to decide when the
legislative measure fails. In that capacity, courts must strive to develop a
276. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 29 (explaining that the United States or a state may file a request for an
amicus curiae without the agreement of the parties or leave of court, but any other party requires consent
by both parties or by leave of court); Brian P. Goldman, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici
Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 916–17 (emphasizing the
use of amicus curiae in the 1980s and its popularity among legal officers).
277. Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U.S. 945, 947
(1954).
278. See supra Parts I, III.
279. See supra Part I.
280. See supra Part III.
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long-lasting jurisprudence based on principles, not technology. To do so,
however, they must understand the technology, its uses, and the demands
on law enforcement to respond. Only when the judicial digital divide is
closed can we hope for consistent guidance for law enforcement, lower
courts, and citizenry as a whole.

